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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the case.

This case is a fairly straightforward worker's compensation case. The issue, simply put, is
I

whether Idaho will adopt the majority or minority view on two worker's coinpensation legal issues
that have been well discussed in other states. The first: Whether a claimant has a legally excusable
reason for failure to meet the one year limitation of Idaho Code $72-706(1), when the employer or
surety gives bad advice, even if it is as the result of an honest mistake, as to the existence or non-

I

I

existence of coverage. Moreover, does the claimant have such a right if the surety fails to correct
the mistaken advice once the surety learns the truth.

I
I

1

The second issue is whether the five year limitation of Idaho Code $72-706(2), which is
triggered when a claimant receives compensation, is also triggered when an employer or surety
provides the claimant with medical treatment.
This case stems froin the misdiagnosis of a scapholunate ligament tear as carpal tunnel
syndrome. Quinton Bunn worked for Heritage Safe installing locking mechanisms. His work
entailed the tightening of screws with a Phillips screw driver. Quinton sustained an injury to his
right wrist, at first diagnosed as carpal tunnel syndrome, but later diagnosed as an scapholunate

I
I

ligament tear. When he reported the injury to his employer, his employer called the Lakeview Clinic
in Soda Springs, and arranged a medical appointment for Quinton. He was sent for and did receive
treatment, including injections, a splint, icing instrnctions and pain medication. The physician's

I

assistant who treated Quinton determined Quinton suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome. As soon
as Liberty Northwest Mutual learned of the diagnosis of carpal tunnel, it mailed a letter Quinton,

I

stating that Quinton's occupational disease would not be covered under worker's compensation.
Simultaneously, Liberty sent a copy of the letter to Lakeview Clinic.'

1

Referee Donahue went straight to the legal issues in his opinion, thus bypassing the relevant
findings, because based on his legal conclusions, many findings were not relevant. For instance, some of the hearing
dealt with whether the appointment made for Quinton by Carol Beckstead was made in behalf of the company or in
behalf of Quinton just as a courtesy from Carol. Under the Referee's holding that "payment" is all that matters it
would make no difference why the appointment was made. However, under the majority rule that providing medical
treatment triggers an extended limitation, it is important to note Liberty Northwest's immediate letter, copied to the
Lakeview Clinic, removes all doubt about whether the surety knew Clinton was being seen by a physician for an
alleged work-related injury
Appellate's Brief
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When Clinton's wrist did not improve, he sought a second opinion. Eventually, Dr. Vennon
Esplin performed exploratory surgery and diagnosed Quinton with scapholunate ligament tear.
Quinton notified LibertyNorthwest of the second diagnosis, but Liberty Northwest did not respond.
Dr. Esplin attempted to correct the tom ligament with surgery, but was unsuccessful. Dr.
Esplin told Quinton that he must try a second surgery, but the prospects of success were doubtful.
By the time Quinton learned the severity of the circumstances, his one year to file a claim under
Idaho Code 5 72-706 had expired.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On April 30, 2005, Qnim Bum sustained an occupational injury which was promptly
reported to his employer, Heritage Safe. Heritage Safe promptly filed Form 2635 with the Industrial
Commission. On May 5, 2005, the Surety, Liberty Northwest Mutual Insurance, wrote Qninton
Bunn notifying him that his injury was not covered under worker's compensation. On or about May
25" of 2007, Quinton Bunn filed his complaint with the Industrial Commission. Defendants filed
their answer raising as a defense the time strictures of Idaho Code 5 72-706. The matter was then
bifurcated to deal first with the Idaho Code 5 72-706 issues. On June 11,2008, Referee Douglas A.
Donohue conducted a hearing on the statute of limitations issues, and Quinton's defenses to the one
year limitation. Qninton raise two defenses: that he had been misled to his detriment by the surety;
and that his employer provided for his medical treatment, thus providing compensation in accordance
with Idaho Code 5 72-706(2). Quinton was therefore entitled to a five year Statute of Limitations.
On October 10, 2008, the Industrial Colnmission issued its Order denying Quinton's
coverage on the basis of Idaho Code

5

72-706. Quinton Bunn filed a timely Motion for

Reconsideration which was denied on December 17,2008. Whereupon, Claimant Quinton Bum
filed his timely appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Quinton Bum began working for Heritage Safe Company in March of 2005. Tr. 16-17:l l-

l o . In April of 2005, Quinton's job duties changed to the installation of lock mechanisms into gun
safes. This was done using a Phillips screwdriver to tighten the screws that hold the safe locks.
Tr. 19:14-20.

Tightening the screws required intense twisting pressure with the wrist.

On April 28, 2005, Quinton felt a weakness in his wrist like a pulled muscle. Tr. 19:20.
He went home from work with a sore and swelling wrist. His hand went blue and numb. Tr. 23:3Appellate's Brief
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5.

Over the weekend he packed it in ice. Tr. 21:s-20. Monday, when he returned to work, he

reported his situation to his supervisor, Shannon Johnson, Tr. 221-23 who in turn reported it Carol
Beckstead, manager of workers compensation issues for Heritage Safe. Beckstead Depo. 6:l-2.
Quinton asked to see a doctor. Carol asked him if he really needed to see a doctor over that.
Tr. 22-31:21-1.

He said that the pain was so intense that he could not work. Tr. 23:3-5. At first,

Carol informed him that a doctor was unavailable. Tr. 22:6-14. Later she called the Lakeview
Clinic in Soda Springs and made an appointment. Tr.23:7-9. Quinton went to Soda Springs where
he was examined by Bret Smith, a physician's assistant.
Heritage Safe, through Carol Beckstead, made the appointment with its preferred medical
provider, Lakeview Medical Clinic. Beckstead Depo. 11-12:14-14 Carol Beckstead testified, "
"If I have employee that I send over there, I tell them specifically on the phone whether Heritage is
paying for it or not." Tr. 38:l-4.

"I tell whoever makes the appointment, this is to be billed to

Liberty Northwest." Tr. 38:6-8. At intake, Heritage Safe Company was listed as the "Financial
Responsible Party." Exhibit 45. The primary financial classification on the billing screen indicated
the matter as "Workmen's Comp", and the primary payer is indicated as "Work Comp." H a ~ e y
Depo. 22-24:24-23.
X-rays were taken. Bret Smith's examination led him to the diagnosis that Quinton was
suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome. Exhibit 8. Bret Smith provided Quinton was avolar splint,
instructed him to ice the wrist three to five times a day, and furnished Quinton with Mobic, an antiinflanmatorymedication. Exhibit 9. He then released Quinton to return to work on condition that
he no longer use manual screwdrivers. Exhibit 4.
The following day, Carol Beckstead, Quinton, and others completed the "Incident/Accident
Investigation Form" The form, signed by Carol Beckstead check the "Y" box indicating "Medical
Attention Needed?'Exhibit 3. Carol also completed the Idaho Worker's Compensation first report
of injury or illness Carol Beckstead checked the number "2" instead of "Ow, under "InitialTreatmentn
on the form, confirming that Quinton received treatment for his injury at the behest of Heritage Safe
Exhibit 1.
The ink had barely dried on the Accident Investigation Report before Lynn Green of Liberty
Northwest, copied a letter to Lakeview Clinic, addressed to Quinton, notifying the clinic that Liberty
Appellate's Brief
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Northwest did not consider Quinton's condition compensable. Exhibit 3; Exhibit 12. The reason
given by Liberty Northwest was that Quinton's injuries were a non-acute occupational disease.
Apparently Ms. Green's letter refers to the fact that, in the State of Idaho, alone, carpal tunnel
syndrome is still treated as an occupational disease rather than an occupational injury.
None of this helped Quinton's sore wrist. On May 3h, Quinton returned to Lakeview Clinic
because his wrist was swelling and hurting more. Exhibit 10. By this time he indicated his pain
was quite significant. On this visit, Dr. Franson also examined the wrist. Exhibit 10. Dr. Franson
was surprised that Quinton's wrist was not improving but did not change Bret Smith's diagnosis.
Either Dr. Franson or Bret Smith provided further treatment by injecting lidocaine and solu-medrol
into the wrist. Exhibit 10.
Quinton had already taken two days off due to the wrist pain. The pain remained so
excruciating he could not work. By mid May, Heritage Safe let him go.

Beckstead IPepo.

Exhibit F.

The pain still persisted. Neither the brace, the lidocaine, nor the instructions to ice the wrist
given him by Bret Smith or Dr. Franson provided Quinton with any sustained improvement.
Desperate to find relief, Quinton sought a second opinion. He visited his own Doctor, Noall
Wolff, in Montpelier. Dr. Wolff ruled out carpal tunnel syndrome and referred Quinton to Dr.
Kenneth Newhouse. Tr. 27:6-12. At Idaho Orthopaedic and Sports Clinic in Pocatello, Idaho, Dr.
Kenneth Newhouse examined Quinton's wrist. He sought a second examination by Dr. Vermon
Esplin. Exhibit 14 and 15. The examination showed symptoms of fraying of the triangular
fibrocartilage complex of the wrist. Exhibit 15. However, this diagnosis, too, did not seem to
explain all of Quinton's symptoms. Exhibit 15. Dr. Esplin concluded the next step would have to
be exploratory surgery of the wrist. Exhibit 18 and 19. On July lqh,2005, Dr. Esplin performed
the surgery, during which he discovered the scapholunate ligament tear and attempted to repair it by
pinning the scapholunate ligament back to the wrist. Exhibit 18 and 19. Although not significant
at this juncture of the proceedings, it should be noted that it took a second surgery in June of 2006,
before Quinton's injury would show improvenlent. Exhibit 40-44.
On May 30, 2005, Quinton notified Ms. Green of Liberty Northwest, that his doctor
disagreed with the diagnosis of carpel tunnel syndrome. Exhibit 13. He received no response. Not
Appellate's Brief
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knowing what Ms. Green meant by the expression "non-acute occupational disease", Tr. 28:12-20
Quinton assumed that he would certainly hear back from LibertyNorthwestif the ruling out of carpal
tunnel syndromeby Dr. Wolff s made any difference to Liberty's reason for denying coverage. Tr.
28:12-24.

As a consequence, Quinton proceeded to seek the medical treatment he needed, but did

not seek legal help until shortly before a year after the injury. Hecontacted an attorney who, alter
the year had expired, told Quinlon he represented Heritage Safe. Tr.

32:l-8.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
This appeal has two issues. Both of which have been defined by a sufficient abundance of
case law from other jurisdictions. The referee has adopted the minority position on both issues.
Appellant contends that Idaho ought to adopt the majority position.
The first issue: If a surety gives bad advice, denying the existence of coverage as a result of
an honest mistake, and fails to correct the denial when apprised of the correct information, does the

claimant have a legallyjustifiable reason to file the claim beyond the one year as proscribed by Idaho
Code $72-706(1).
The second issue: If an employer makes arrangements for a claimant to receive medical
treatment for an occupational injury, does that treatment constitute "payment of benefits" for the
purposes of Idaho Code $72-706(2), thereby affording the Claimant five years to file his claim from
the date of last benefits.
ARGUMENT
1.

The Suretv "mislead" Ouinton, Within the Meaning of Idaho Code 8 72-706(1L

Idaho Code $72-706(1) provides:
When no compensation paid. When a claim for compensationhas been made and no
compensation has been paid thereon, the claimant, unless misled to his prejudice by
the employer or surety, shall have one (1) year from the date of making claim within
which to make and file with the commission an application requesting a hearing and
an award under such claim.
The issue here is whether "mislead to his prejudice " includes unintentional misleading as
well as intentional. The majority rule is well explained in

Bauer

v. State

ex rel. Wyoming

Worker's Compensation Div. 695P.2d 1048 (Wyo.,1985). Thesupreme CourtofWyomingsaid:

[Flraud should not be the only basis for relief in worker's compensation cases. The
Appellate's Brief
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limitation period is short - just one year. The injury resulting to the worker during
the course of her employment is our concern. If she has a valid claim which is lost
because of some action by the employer or the insurance provider (here the state of
Wyoming) reasonably relied upon by the employee to her detriment, relief should be
granted.

Referee Donahue takes the opposite position. In paragraphs 15 and 16 he declares:
15.

Nothing in Employer's actions reasonably served tomisleadClaimant
about eligibility for workers' compensation benefits. The believe or
expectations about payment held by Claimant's treaters do not
establish that claimant was misled. Neither claimant's nor any
physician's hopes or expectations of payment can alter the Idaho
workers' Compensation law. Below are three reasons why.

16.

First, Claimant received a denial letter. His subsequent request for a
review does not legally require further response from Defendants.
Claimant does not allege that any oral promises were made which
may have misled claimant after he received the denial letter.

Referee Donohue, at both the hearing and in the briefing, was asked to consider whether
"mislead" for the purposes of Idaho Code § 72-706(1) includes innocent misleading, as well as
intentional. In other words, where the surety or the employer unintentionally mislead the claimant,
by telling him he has no coverage, should the surety or the claimant bear the consequences. This
issue was never addressed in the Opinion. The letter from Liberty Northwest telling Quinton that
his circumstance was not covered by the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law, (Exhibit 12) is
misleading on its face. It implies Quinton's condition is a non-acute occupational disease. The
surety, no doubt, was mislead by the diagnosis of the physician's assistant. Granted, Liberty
Northwest's letter to Quinton stating he had no coverage may have been innocent in its intent. But
nonetheless, it was misleading. Unlike the opinion of Referee Donohue, other states hold that the
employer and the surety stand in a fiduciary relationship to the claimant. The consequences of a
mistaken denial of coverage fall on the surety and the employer, not on the claimant.
For example, in Robertson v. Brissey's Garage, Inc., 270 S.C. 58, 240 S.E.2d 810
(1978). The Supreme Court of South Carolina reached such a conclusion based on misinformation

from the surety. The carrier advised the widow claimant that it had determined her husband was the
Appellate's Brief
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president and part owner of the business and not an employee, and his injury was therefore not
compensable. The carrier further advised the widow that she had one year to file a claim, but she
failed to make a claim until almost three years after the injury. The court held that the employer and
canier were, by virtue of the statement of non-compensability, estopped to raise the one-year statute
of limitations. The court restated the principle of equitable estoppel and applied it thus:
The conduct of defendant and its insurance carrier may be such as to estop them froin
presenting the statutory limitation as a defense in bar of the claim for compensation,
if the effect of such conduct was to mislead or deceive claimant, whether
intentionally or not, and induce hiin to withhold or postpone filing his claim petition
until more than a year had elapsed from the occurrence of the accident.
240 S.E.2d at 81 1. (citations omitted). The South Caroline Supreme Court specifically addressed
whether bad faith need be an element of "misleading" by the Worker's compensation carrier. The
court said:
Although the carrier acted in good faith, the fact is inescapable that it occupied a
position far superior to that of the claimant. The claimant was ignorant of the
Workmen's Compensation Act and of business practices generally. This factor may
be taken into account in determining whether the claimant was misled. . . . We also
feel that it may properly be considered in determiningwhether the claimant'sreliance
was justified. Although claimant was advised that she could file a claim, it was
reasonable under the circumstances for her to feel that such would be a htile gesture
in view of the positive assertion by the carrier of the reasons why the death was not
compensable. . . . It is clear to us that the words of the adjuster were being accepted
by the claimant without question, which is not strange when considered in the light
of the disparity between the knowledge and experience of the parties. We feel that
the failure of the claimant to file a claim was a reasonable reaction to the initiative
taken by the carrier.
240 S.E.2d at 812
In Levo v. General-Shea-Morrison,128Mont. 570,280P.2d 1086(1955),thefactsarevery
much similar to Quinton's case. The claimant was informed by the employer that his heart attack
was the result of non-industrial disease and not any industrial injury, and that there was no use in
filing a claim, "nothing that could be done". The court held:
[Tlhe advice here given by the assistant project manager and personnel director and
the advice given by a lawyer who the claimant thought to be a company lawyer did
not permit the claimant in good conscience to file a claim. Ignorance based on
completely erroneous advice from persons who are directly connected with the affairs
Appellate's Brief
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of the employer can even be more profound and dangerous in its consequence than
ignorance based on no advice at all. Such advice effectivelyprevents a conscientious
employee from filing a claim for an award or at least until different advice of equal
or higher standing is received. According to the record the conclusion is inescapable
that claimant was actually dissuaded from filing a claim by the agents of defendant.
We find that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied under the facts in
this cause.

The Court of Appeals for the State of Arizona looked at the same issue and reached the same
result as the majority of other states. In McKaskle v. industrial Com'n of Arizona 135 Ariz. 168,
659 P.2d 1313 (Ariz.App.,1982),theclaimant was injured in the course of employment, but failed
to file a claim for worker's compensation because his supervisors told him he was an independent
contractor and not an employee entitled to benefits. The court concluded:
We hold that the employer and canier may be estopped to raise the statute of
limitations, either by assurances that the claimant will be "taken care of' or, as here,
by management personnel declaring that the claimant has no claim since he was an
independent contractor and not an employee. The claimant may be equally harmed
by his reasonable reliance on either "positive" or "negative" assertions. Nor are we
persuaded that a characterization of coverage or compensability as a "question of
law" renders the principle of estoppel inapplicable.
659 P.2d at 1317-13 18. In the same year, the Arizona Court of Appeals also considered a case where
neither the employer nor surety supplied the bad advice, but rather the agency that sold the surety's
policy provided the claimant with the wrong form to file. The dilatory filing was excused. The court
said:
The issue is not limited to whether any of the respondents actively mislead petitioner
(intentionally or not), see Keeler v. Industrial Commission, 122 Ariz. 16,592 P.2d,
1282 (App. 1979). Rather, the broad issue in this case requires consideration of
whether petitioner's error was the result of her reasonable reliance on incorrect
information. In other words, any element of "fault" is not conclusive.
Cohen v. lndustrial Commission of Arizona,

In

133 Ariz 24,648 P.2d 139, 140 (1982).

Bauer v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div.,

695 P.2d 1048

(Wyo.,1985) the employer's mistaken statements that the employee had no worker's compensation
coverage because the employee was part-time in her work as a member of an ambulance service.
AppeUate's Brief
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In a well reasoned opinion, the court discussed the broad body of case law on the subject. The court
discussed the Commission's argument that the "bad advice" relied on by the claimant was the result
of an honest mistake, and therefore should not be the basis for an estoppel. The court concluded to
the contrary:
Appellant had a valid, meritorious claim that was not filed because of reliance upon
her employer's representation that she was not covered by worker's compensation.
We hold that the employer's misleading statements, although unintentional, were
sufficient to constitute estoppel and prevent the employer and the state of Wyoming
from invoking the statute of limitations as a defense. This case is, therefore, reversed
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Referee Donahue determined that Liberty Northwest did nothing misleading, even though
Liberty's denial letter to Quinton is, on its face, clearly misleading. Telling Quinton he had no
coverage, because he had a non-accute occupational disease, is every bit as misleading as telling a
widow claimant that her husband had no coverage because he was an owner, (Robertson, supra);
or that a heart attack is a non-industrial disease, (Levo, supra); or that the employee's private
contractor status, (McKaskle, supra) or part-time status (Bauer, supra) precluded them from
coverage. The referee also offered no explanation as to why Idaho should wander an aberrational
path alone, instead of following the majority rule of its neighboring states; or why Idaho employees
should receive less protection under Idaho's worker's compensation laws than the employees of
other states.
Having advised Quinton that he had no coverage, Liberty Northwest had a duty to Quinton
to correct their denial letter when notified that Liberty's denial of coverage was based on a bad
diagnosis. In some states the "misleading" information constitutes an estoppel against the surety's
defense of Statute of Limitations. In Idaho, the consequences of misleading is also statutory. The
claimant is statutorily excused from the one year restriction of Idaho Code 5 72-706(1) .

2.

The Five Year Limitation of Idaho Code 872-706(2). is Triggered When an Emplover
Provides Medical Treatment for an Iniured Claimant.

Idaho Code 5 72-706(2) provides:
Appellate's Brief
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When compensation discontinued. When payments of compensation have been
made and thereafter discontinued, the claimant shall have five (5)
vears from the date
. ,.
of the accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational
disease within which to make and file with the commission an application requesting
a hearing for further compensation and award.
The question presented is whether the providing of medical benefits is the equivalent of "payments
of compensation" for purposes of initiating the five year limitation. One would think this Court had
already laid that issue to rest. Apparently not. In Bainbridge v. Boise Cascade Plywood Mill,
111 Idaho 79,721 P.2d 179, (1986) the ldaho Supreme Court stated :
"Compensation" is a word of artunder thee Workmen's Compensation act and refers
to income and medical benefits "made under the provisions of this law, " 1.C. $72102(5), (12), and (15).
211 Idaho at 83.
In Kyen v. City of Coeurd%lene, 115 Idaho 791,770 P.2d 800 (1989) the Supreme Court
elaborated on its Bainbridge holding. This Supreme Court stated:
In Bainbridge, we held that I.C. $ 72-706(2) "compensation" includes both income
and medical benefits for the purposes of the tolling provisions. There, compensation
was viewed to a "a word of art under the Workman's Compensation Act and [it]
refers to income and medical benefits."
115 Idaho at 802

Although the rulings of this Court seem clear enough, in the Commission's Order of October
10, 2008, Referee Donohue says: "Claimant's alternate argument

-

that treatment somehow

constitutes 'compensation' is unpersuasive." Recommendation, 7 20. Specifically, he says:
20.

Claimant's alternative argument - that treatment somehow
constitutes "compensation" - is unpersuasive. The limitation statute
is based upon payment. Idaho Code C) 72-706. By relevant statutory
definition, "compensation" equates the "payment of medical
benefits." Idaho Code 5 72-102(7); Bainbridge v. Boise Cascade
Plywood Mill, 111 ldaho 79,721 P2d. 179 (1986). Even Claimant's
cited case, Park v. Mountain Timber, 200 WL 2799942 (2000),
supports the proposition. In Park, compensation was "paid" because
Employer acquiesced to Claimant's self-help method of
reimbursement for medical bills. In Park, the receipt of treatment did
not trigger the five-year statute; the payment for medical bills
incurred did.

Appellate's Brief
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According to Referee Donahue's opinion, the exception in Idaho Code $, 72-706(2) turns
entirely upon the word "payment". Such a rendering is rather anomalous considering that the statute
is to be liberally construed in order to benefit claimants. Referee Donahue's interpretation is a very
strict interpretation, not a liberal interpretation in favor of claimants, as required by the Worker's
Compensation Law. What is all themore anomalous is that the Referee strictly interprets "payment"
when even Idaho Statute does otherwise. Idaho Code § 72-102 (20) defines "medical and related
benefits" as:
"Medical and related benefits" means paymentsprovided for made for medical,
hospital, burial and other services as provided in this law other than income benefits.
(Emphasis added).
By the referee's interpretation Park v. Mountain Timber, 200 WL279942 (2000), turns
purely on the fact that the claimant stole sufficient property from the employer to make a "selfhelp"
payment by the employer for the medical benefits. In other words, if Quinton had gone back to
Heritage and stole some property, he could now get worker's compensation benefits, but since he
did not, he is on his own. Such is not, nor ought not to be, the Idaho law.
No one ever "pays" medical benefits. Medical benefits are provided, h i s h e d o r authorized.
By strict interpretation, the phrase "when payments of compensation have been made" would not
include medical benefits at all. But the Idaho Supreme Court already detennined otherwise. In
Bainbridge v. Boise Cascade Plywood Mill Co.,

supra, this court said the phrase "payments of

compensation" when liberally construed, includes "made under the provisions of this law." This
Court, for good reason, used the word "made" not "paid." By the same policy, "payment" of medical
benefits would also include fkrnishing of medical benefits, providing of medical benefits, or
authorization of medical benefits. Such is clearly the policy in other states

In fact, overwhelmingly, the majority of jurisdictions are persuaded that treatment is
compensation. The referee's conclusion that: "Claimant's alternate argument - that treatment
somehow constitutes 'compensation' is unpersuasive" only appears to be unpersuasive to this
referee. The Supreme Court of Florida reached the opposite conclusion. In McNeiliy v. Farm
Stores, Inc., 553

So.2d 1279 (1989), The Florida High Court explained:

Here, Dr. Cather was McNeilly's authorized physician at the time of the injury, and
Appellate's Brief
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remained so at the time of his September 1987 visit, which was within two years of
the employer's last payment of benefits. The fact that McNeilly paid for the visit
personally is also irrelevant, in that the significant event is the rendition of remedial
treatment before the expiration ofthe two year period, and not the payment of the bill
therefore. Seamco at 900. Therefore, the JCC erred in holding that the September
1987 visit was not fiunished by the emnployerlcarrier so as to revive the limitations
period on that date, and the April 10, 1988 claim for benefits was timely filed.
When the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, when posed with the very same question
in Frank v. Industrial Commission of Colorado, 96 Colo. 364,43 P.2d 158 (1935), the Court
framed the question as follows:
To obviate this purported defense, [non-"payment" of benefits] and avoid the
apparent bar, the claimant relies upon the sentence immediately following the
passage just above quoted, namely: 'This limitation shall not apply to any claimant
to whom compensation has been paid. He contends that the furnishing of the
sewicesrendered by, or under the direction of; the company'sphysician constituted
-in view of the power and authority granted the physician by the company's contract
described below - thepayment ofcompensation within the meaning of the language
used.
96 Colo. at 369-70. (Emphasis added) To answer that argument the Colorado High Court said:
Whether the company would have been charged with such responsibility if it had
not had actual notice or knowledge need not be now determined or considered.
Here such notice or knowledge was proved. And by the express terms of the
contract, the treatment was to be given just as was done. This, so far as the
claimant is concerned, was (at least under the facts shown herein) the exact
equivalent ofpayment;
96 Colo. at 372. (Emphasis added).
Similarly, in Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Nolen, 164 Okla. 213,23 P.2d 381 (1933),
the Oklahoma Supreme Court analyzed:
In the case at bar, claimant was not paid compensation, but was furnished medical
treatment for more than a month. The case therefore presents a question of first
impression in this state, viz., whether or not thefldrnishing of medical treatment
alone is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations (section 7301, supra).
We are of the opinion that thefurnishing of medical treatment recognizes liability
and constitutes the equivalent of thepayment of compensation, and is sufficient to
toll the statute.
Appellate's Brief
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23 P.2d at 382. (Emphasis added).
In the State of New York, the Supreme Court analyzed:
Even though the usual medical care which is regarded as an advance payment of
compensation is one in which the employer directly retains the physician, or the
physician or nurse is in the general employment of the employer, it seems clear that
within the intent of the statute, a direction to a claimant to get medical care, which
he literally follows, and as a result of which medical care is actually given, can
also constitute furnishing of medical treatment.
Colangelo v. B.S. McCarey Company, 13 A.D.2d at 592,212 N.YS. 2d 466 (1961).

(Emphasis

added).
In Cantone v. Health Enterprises Management, tnc., 308 A.D.2d 646,764 N.Y.S.2d
294 (2003), the Supreme Court, Appellate Division of New York explained:
However, "remuneration in the form of wages or medical treatment may constitute
advance payments of compensation, rendering inapplicable the limitations period
established by workers' Compensation Law 28, where the remuneration is provided
in recognition of liability."
308 A.D. 2d at 647. (Emphasis added).
In Arkansas, the Court of Appeals, in Plante v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 319 Ark. 126, 890
S.W.3d 253 (1994) expressed the following:
The one-year limitations period begins to run from the last payment of compensation,
which this court has held means from the date of the last h i s h i n g of medical
services.

***

This court has also stated that employers and carriers mnust either have actual
knowledge or constructive knowledge that medical services are being provided
before they are deemed to have furnished medical services.

***
The respondent cannot succeed on the limitations defense, therefore, simply because
the authorized physician never submitted a separate bill for the 1989 and 1990
follow-up visits, which were presumably included in the payment for surgery,
because it is the furnishing of the services that tolls the statute, not the payment
therefor.
3 19 Ark at 130 (Emphasis added).
Appellate's Brief
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In accord is the Missouri Court of Appeals, which, in McDaniel v. General Motors
Assembly Division, 637

S.W.2d 194 (1982) reasoned as follows:

As pertinent here, the claim must be filed within one year after the injury or within
one year after payment has been made by reason of the injury. Medical treatment of
a disability has been interpreted as being a payment, and a claim filed within one
year thereafter is timely. Welborn v. Southern Equipment Co., 395 s.W.2d 119,124
(Mo banc 1965); Lloyd v. County Electric Co., 599 S.W.2d 57,60 (Mo.App. 1980).
The question then, is whether the supplying of salve and directing its application by
the employer's nurse constituted medical treatment, for the claim was filed within
one year thereafter. Certainly, if an employer's doctor's advice that an employee take
warm water soaks for an ankle injury constitutes medical treatment, as in Faries v.
ACF Industries, 53 1 S.W. 2d 93,99 (Mo.App. 1975), or, similarly, a company nurse
supplying an ace bandage for a sore knee tolls the statute as in Morgan v. Krey
packing Co., 403 S.W.2d 668,670 (Mo.App.1966), afortiori thesalveprescribedfor
a bad back likewise tolls the statute. The claim was thereby timely.
637 S.W.2d, at 195-196. (Emphasis added)
The Supreme Court of Tennessee applied the same logical approach in Universal
Underwriters Insurance Co., v. A.J. King Lumber Company, 553 S.W. 2d 749 (1977). Therein

the court reasoned:
The furnishing of medical sewices by a physician employed by the employer or
insurer is such a "voluntary payment of compensation." Reed v. Genesco, Inc.,
Tenn., 512 S.W.2d 1 (1974); Fields v. Lowe furniture Corp., 220 Tenn. 212, 415
S.W. 2d 340 (1967). The fact that no "payments" were made from November 16,
1972, the date of the first payment, until January 21,1973, when they were resumed
did not constitute a "ceasing: within the meaning of the statutory proviso.

553 S.W.2d, at 750. (Emphasis added).
Likewise, in Spencer v. Stone container Corporation, 72 Ark.App. 450,38 S.W.3d 909
(2001), the Court of Appeals of Arkansas Third Division explained:
Our oft-stated rule is thatforpurposes of the aforementioned statute of limitations,
"the furnishing of medical services constitutes payment of compensation . . ."
Heflin v. Pepsi Cola, 244 Ark. 195, 197,424 S.W.2d 365,366 (1968). Moreover,
an employer is deemed to be furnishing such services if it has either actual notice
of has reason to know of a claimant receiving medical treatment..
72 Ark. App. at 456. (Emphasis added).
In McGhee v. Oklahoma Metal Heat Treating, 644 P.2d 127 (1982), the Court of
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Appeals of Oklahoma Division No. 1 faced the interpretation of a statute which read:
The right to claim compensation under this act shall be forever barred unless within
one (1) year after the injury or death, a claim for compensation thereunder shall be
filed with the commission. Provided, however, claims may be filed at any time
within one (1) from the date of last payment of any compensation or remuneration
paid in lieu of compensation.

In the end, the Court of Appeals of Oklahoma concluded:
All in all, we conclude on the undisputed facts of this case that the claim was timely
filed. It was undisputed that the claimant's employer took him to the hospital and
paid his bills following the accident. It was undisputed that the insurance carrier later
told the claimant to go to a doctor.

Although Referee Donahue found "claimant's argument - "that treatment somehow
constitutes 'compensation'- is unpersuasive," that argument seems to have found a good deal of
traction in virtually evely other jurisdiction that has considered it. In fact, it would seem even the
Supreme Court of Idaho would find some persuasion in that argument in light of its following
statement in Ryen v. City of Coeur DYAlene,115 Idaho 791,770 P.2d 800 (1989). There the court
said:
Claimant argues that the definition of compensation supplied by I.C. $ 72-102(5)
purports to include "all of the income benefits and the medical and related benefits
and medical services," and is controlling. We agree. We further view the question
to have been clearly answered in Bainbridge v. Boise-Cascade Plywood Mill, 111
Idaho 79,721 P.2d 179 (1986) and Facer v. E.R. Steed Equipment Co., 95 Idaho 608,
514 P.2d 841 (1973). In Bainbridge we held that LC. $72-706(2) "compensation"
includes both income and medical benefits for the purposes of the tolling provisions.
There, compensation was viewed to be "a word of art under the Workman's
Compensation act and it refers to income and medical benefits..."
115 Idaho, at 793.
Referee Donohue aptly notes that "by relevant statutory definition 'compensation' equates
with 'payment of medical benefits'." He addresses the decision of Park v. Mountain Timber,
2000 Westlaw 279942 (2000), where the employer never paid for medical care. The employee paid
for it and then made it up to himself by stealing from his employer. Yet, in Park, the Commission
Appellate's Brief
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found that the requirement for payment of medical benefits had been met. Referee Donahue
distinguishes Park, noting that the compensation was "paid" through the injured employee's self-help
method of reimbursing himself through surreptitious removal of his employer's property.
The point where Quinton takes issue with Referee Donohue's opinion is the referee's
conclusion that it is the actual monetary payment to the medical provider - not the affording of care
to the injured employee - that triggers the five year statute of limitations provided for in Idaho Code

5 72-706.
The reason Quinton takes issue on this point is that, other jurisdictions have looked at this
very issue. And, once again, as far as we can find, every other jurisdiction in the country agrees with
Quinton's position and not Referee Donohue's. The state's Supreme Courts appear to be virtually
unanimous in reaching the opposite conclusion as the Referee; i.e. they universally agree that it is
the furnishing of the care to the employee, - not the cutting of the check to the doctor - that
constitutes "payment."
This is clearly the more !ogical conclusion for a myriad of reasons. First, as in Idaho Code

5

72-706(2), the expression "When payments of compensation have been made. . ." refers to

payments to the injured employee. The statute concerns itselfwith compensation to Idaho's laborers

- not their physicians. Since medical benefits are not "paid" to a claimant, the affording to,
authorization of, furnishing to, providing for medical benefits to an injured employee is the same as
"payment" for the sake of Worker's Compensation Statutes.
In Heflin v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co;, 244 Ark. 195,424 S.W.2d 365 (1968), the Supreme
Court of Arkansas addressed a similar statute that also turned on the word "payment"The court then
reasoned:
The opinion in the case points out that the holding of the Ragon case followed the
general rule that the ,furnishing of medical services constitutes payment of
compensation within the meaning of s 81-13 18(b) and that such ["payment"
suspends the running of the time for filing a claim for compensation. The decision
is not in any respect based on the time at which the medical bills were paid. This
holding is sound because the claimant is "compensated" by the furnishing of the
services and not by the payment of the charges therefor.
244 Ark. at 197. (Emphasis added),
In contrast to the analysis of the Arkansas Court of Appeals, Referee Donohue's
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recommendation or findings in this case concludes: "In Park, compensation was "paid" because
employer acquiesced to claimant's self-help method of reimbursement for medical bills. In Park,
the receipt of treatment did not trigger the five year statute; the payment for medical bills incurred
did." Recommendation 7 20. Referee Donohue's opinion is the exact opposite as the conclusion
and reasoning of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Heftin.
Other courts that have considered the same issue side with the reasoning of the Arkansas
Supreme Court. For example, the District Court of Appeals in Florida decided, in Gilbert v.
Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority,

674 So.2d 818 (1996), that a worker's compensation

claimant's receipt of medical care from an authorized provider for industrial injuries tolled the
running of the statute of limitations, despite the claimant's failure to request the employer or surety
to pay the hospital services under worker's compensation.
In Infante v. Mansfield Construction Company, 47 Conn.App. 530, 706 A.2d 984
(1998), the Appellate Court of Connecticut explained:
The exception is, no doubt, based upon the fact that if the employer furnishes medical
treatment he must know that an injury has been suffered which at least may he the
basis of such a claim [for compensation]. Gesmundo v. Bush, 133 Conn. 607,612,
53 A.2d 392 (1947). In the event that a representative or agent of the employer,
authorized to send the employee to aphysician, does so, that constitutesfurnishing
medical treatment forpurposes of the exception. Id. It is clear that the defendants
were not ignorant of the injury, and do not claim to be prejudiced in any way. Even
i f the employer did not pay for the medical treatment frzrnished by a physician
selected by him, he has "jurnished" such treatment within the meaning of the
statute ifhe has sent the claimant for medical treatment, thereby authorizing i6
47 Conn.App. at 535-36. (Emphasis added).

In A~inmeritor,Inc. v.

Redd,

192 P.3d 1261 (2008) the Supreme Cowt of Oklahoma

explained:
The issue presented in the present matter is whether a claimant may, within two years
after the last authorized medical treatment, when the examination and treatment are
allowed by stipulation of the employer, amend the claim to include additional injury
from the same cu~nulativetrauma. We answer in the affirmative.
In reasoning its opinion, the court concluded:
[W]e find that Arvinmeritor, by stipulating to the treatment by Dr. Ruffin,
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including a complete examination as well as allowing for treatment and physical
therapy, Redd's continuing medical treatment was authorized. Since this continuing
medical treatment was authorized, the state of limitations was tolled.

192 P.3d at 1263. (Emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma relied upon its decision a year previous in 2007 in
American Airlines v. Hickman 164 P.3d 146 (2007).

Thecourt framed theargument in Hickman,

as follows:
The employer argues that Ibarra v. Hitch Farms, 2002 OK 41, 48 P.3d 802, in
construing 5 43(A), holds that the operative event in determining whether the statute
of limitations has been tolled is not the authorization of medical treatment, but the
last paynent of authorized medical treatment. Because the employer did not pay for
the claimant's examination when he was sent to theMedCenterby his supervisor, the
employer claims that the statute of limitations was not tolled.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court then grappled with the same issue that must be grappled with
in this case, namely what happens when neither the employer nor the surety actually "pay" for the
medical treatment. The Oklahoma Supreme Court then proceeded with its reasoning as follows:

In Ibarra the facts reveal that the claimant, Ibarra, had received medical treatment,
and the employer had paid for the authorized treatment. Ibarra, 2002 OK 41, fi 2,48
P.3d 802. In the case now before this Court, nopayment was made. The question
we must answer is whether the ambiguous statute construed in Ibarra excludes
tolling the statute of limitations where medical treatment was authorized, but not
payment was made for the treatment. The claimant answers that the employer
should not be able to avoid the tolling of the statute of limitations by simply not
paying for treatment if authorized. We do not believe that Ibarra precludes the
date of treatment as the operative datefor tolling the statute of limitationsfound
in $3 43(a) of title 85.
164 P.3d at 149. (Emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of Tennessee faced the same issue in Fields v. Lowe Furniture
Corporation, 415

S.W.2d 340 (1967). Treatment had been furnished, but the bills had not been

paid. The Supreme Court of Tennessee addressed the issue as follows:
[Tlhe question thus presented is whether or not treatment of this employee by the
company doctor in May, 1964, tolled the statute, hereinafter to be quoted. There is
no showing that these bills for the treatment of this man up until May, 1964, or that
the bill of the doctor to whom the company doctor has referred the man to in
Appellate's Brief
0:\69\6943PleadingsL4ppeall4ppellate'sBrief.wpd

Page 18

Nashville, had ever been paid. As a matter of fact the record is rather to the effect
that these bills had not been paid by anyone.
415 S.W. 2d at 341. The Tennessee Supreme Court answered the question as follows:
There is no doubt that, under the facts appearing in the record, the services
renderedfor the compensable injury here established by the evidence operated to
avoid the bar of the statute. The company's contract recognized its liability to
render, or to pay the expense of such services, and conferred upon its physician
generally authorityfor furnishing those services and supplies in all cases. Hence,
inasmuch as all the evidence shows that the claimant did not sustain a compensable
injury of which the company forthwith received actual notice and knowledge, the
treatment given him fell within the class which, under both the statute and the
contract, imposed upon the company unqualified financial responsibility. This, so
far as the claimant is concerned, was (at least under the facts shown herein) &
exact eauivalent ofoavment: and he was thereby exempted from the requirement
of sewing the commission with written notice, because "compensation has been
paid"

415 S.W3d at 342. (Emphasis added).
Likewise, in Seamco Laboratories v. Pearson, 424 So.2d 898 (1983), the District Court
of Appeals for Florida reasoned:
The deputy commissioner in the case sub judice correctly noted that even though Dr.
Molloy did not submit a bill or a report to the employerlcarrier within the two-year
period, as the Vincent physician did, he rendered remedial treatment before the
expiration of the two-year period. It is the remedial treatment that tolls the statute,
not the report of the treatment.
424 So.2d at 899-900. (Emphasis added).
Also, the Court ofAppeals for Kansas, in Sparks v. Wichita White Truck Trailer Center,
inc. 7 Kan.

App. 2d 383,642 P.2d 574 (1982) reasoned:

As we read the cases, in determining whether medical care is "compensation" under
the act neither the fact nor time of payment of the bills is determinative; the issue is
whether the medical care was authorized, either expressly or by reasonable
implication. If the claimant receives medical care with the reasonable expectation of
payment by the employer the care is "compensation" when rendered even though it
may never be paid for.

***

Once the employer assumed the responsibility of fun~ishingmedical care the
workman was entitled to rely on that action; notice of termination to the doctor was
not notice to the claimant. In that case.it appears the doctor hadnever beenpaidfor
his services, but the furnishing of those services under what appeared to the
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claimant to be the authority of the employer amounted to '$ayment of
compensation" to the claimant.

642 P.2d at 577. (Emphasis added).
All of this brings us back to our original question: Can an employer or the surety preclude
the triggering of the five year statute of limitations of I.C. 5 72-706(2) by refusing to pay for medical
care or treatment it has authorized. The answer, as rendered in virtually any other jurisdiction, is
clearly: No, they cannot. The determining factor is whether the claimant is afforded medical
treatment by the employer or surety, not whether the employer or surety put a check in the mail.
SUMMARY
In its final analysis, this case is about a young man who suffered a serious disabling injury
to his dominant hand while doing his duty of tightening screws with a screwdriver for Heritage
Safe Company.
Heritage Safe, through Carol Beckstead, made an appointment with its preferred medical
provider, Lakeview Medical Clinic. Carol Beckstead testified, "I tell - - at the time I tell the doctor's
office, your know, that it will be billed to Liberty Northwest at that time." Tr. 36:9-11. All the
intake documents at the hospital indicated that Quinton Bum was seen as a worker's comp case with
the responsible party being Heritage Safe. The First report of Injury or Illness prepared by Heritage,
Exhibit 1 confirms Quinton was sent for" treatment." The Incident 1Accident Investigation form,
Exhibit 3 also confirms that "medical attention [was] needed.. No doubt, Heritage Safe "provided'
Quinton with medical treatment. No doubt, Liberty Northwest mislead Quinton when it gave as its
reason to deny him coverage that: employers are not liable for "non-accute occupational
disease."Exhibit 12.
Referee Donohue, in conclusion of his recommendation opines that: "Eventually claimant's
argument would lead to the conclusion that every time an employer designated a physician to check
out a potential worker's compensation related injury or occupational disease, its surety would
automaticallybe liable for benefits regardless ofwhether the potential injury or disease met the other
statutoryrequirementsas determined by the Idaho Legislature.'' Recommendation 'I121. But this
is not that case. The law and the decisions clearly distinguishbetween instances where the employer
sends the employee to a doctor for diagnosis of the cause of an injury or illness, and instances where
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the employer furnishes the e~nployeewithmedical treatment for work related injuries. This case is
not about the situation where the employer or the surety sends the employee for an examination for
the sole purpose of finding whether the employee is entitled to compensation. This is not the case
where the employer or surety seeks an examination to see whether an injured employee is capable
of returning to work. Neither Quinton, nor Liberty Northwest, nor Heritage Safe made the
argument that the Quinton was sent to Lakeview Medical Clinic solely to determine whether he had
suffered a compensable injury. He was sent for, and did receive, treatment, including injections, a
splint, icing instructions and inflamation medication. Idaho Code 5 72-432 provides for medical
treatment for occupational injuries is a benefit under the worker's compensation law.
When Idaho Code 5 72-706(2) refers to "when payments of co~npensationhave been made,
it is talking about payments to the claimant, because, by this Court's judicial interpretation, it
includes medical benefits. It is talking about the providing or furnishing or affording of medical
benefits to the claimant. It does not mean that if the employer or the surety arrange for the claimant
to receive medical benefits, but thereafter stiff the medical provider on its bill, the surety can thereby
annul the triggeringof the five year statute of limitations under Idaho Code 5 72-506(2). That statute
is triggered when the injured employee is furnished the treatment.
Finally, Liberty Northwest and other sureties are in the business of workers compensation
claims on a daily basis thoughout every state in these great United States. They have professionals,
with years of experience, who write those denial letters. They have a battery of lawyers and
researchers to guide their decisions to send denial letters like Exhibit 12. On the other hand,
injured employees such as Quinton Bunn, young, inexperienced, working frequently for at or near
minimum wage, will usually encounter no more than one occupational injury in a lifetime.
When the legislature provided that a surety who misleads a claimant cannot benefit from the
one year statute of limitations, the legislature did not say that the surety's actions must be criminal,
willful, or even negligent. Clearly, the letter written by Liberty Northwest to Quinton Bum was
plainly wrong. Liberty Northwest stood in a superior position to correct the consequences of the
error once the error was discovered. Because Liberty Northwest ignored Quinton's helpless and
unknowledgeable effortto correct the error, either Quintonor the Suretymust bear the consequences:
either Liberty Northwest should take responsibility and help Quinton, in the manner that Idaho
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Workers Compensation laws were intended to help injured employees, or Quinton must go through
life with his dominant hand disabled, paying his own medical bills, even though he injured his duties
hand performing his duties to his employer.
The question comes down to whether it is true that Quinton should bear the loss, instead of
Liberty Northwest, because Quinton believed Liberty Northwest was in asuperior position to inform
him accurately as to whether he had a right to compensation. If such is the law, such ought not to
be the law. Quinton has a valid, meritorious clam that was not filed because of reliance upon
Liberty Northwest's representation that he was not covered by worker's compensation. A Surety's
misleading statements, although unintentional, are sufficient to constitute an estoppel and prevent
an employer from invoking the statute of limitations as a defense.
For these reasons, QuintonBunn would ask this court to reverse the Industrial Commission's
Opinion of October 2nd,2008 Opinion and acknowledge the legitimacy of Quinton's claim.
Respectfully submitted this 1'' day ofMay, 2009,2009.
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